Mr. Speaker, the

Spratt approach is the correct approach.

It says that the President,

should go to the United Nations, go to

Kofi Annan and tell him that we authorize

President Bush to use all of the

Armed Forces necessary to eliminate

the chemical, the biological and the

nuclear weapons of Saddam Hussein;

and if Kofi Annan and the U.N. say,

‘‘no, we will not authorize that,’’ then

it says that the President can come

back to the United States Congress immediately,

and then we would authorize

the President to go in to Iraq with

any other Nation in the world that

would want to join us, and we will ensure

that the chemical, biological and

nuclear weapons of Saddam Hussein

are taken from his possession.

This is the way to go. If the U.N. says

no, then we can say ‘‘yes’’ but the

President has an obligation to go to

the United Nations first and to find out

if Kofi Annan and the U.N. we will not

forcibly ensure that these weapons of

mass destruction are confiscated.

Vote yes on Spratt.

Mr. Speaker, the President

has asked this Congress to support action that

foresees the possibility of sending our loved

ones—our sons and daughters, brothers and

sisters, friends and neighbors—into combat in

a foreign land. No more serious a decision

ever faces Congress.

The threat that we confront is Saddam Hussein.

Saddam is in a category of his own. No

other head-of-state has been the subject of an

11-year international campaign to disarm and

sanction him. He has invaded two of his

neighbors, assassinated 16 of his own family

members, tried to assassinate former President

Bush, lied about his weapons buildup,

fired missiles at Israel, and gassed his own

people. The prospect that such a despot has

biological and chemical weapons—anthrax,

sarin gas, smallpox—and is nearing nuclear

capability is a looming threat to millions.

We as a nation have the responsibility to

stop him.

I would have preferred that we proceed in

the manner outlined in the Spratt substitute,

which would have given the President all the

authority needed at this time to disarm Saddam.

The Spratt substitute would have allowed

the UN to proceed with tough ‘‘anytimeanywhere’’

inspections, given the UN the military

backing to make those inspections work,

and ensured that Saddam Hussein lost his capacity

to threaten the world.

Unfortunately, the Spratt substitute failed,

and we are now faced with a vote, up or

down, on the broader resolution negotiated

between the White House, Minority Leader

GEPHARDT, and others.

This too would accomplish the goal of giving

the President sufficient authority to enforce UN

resolutions regarding Iraq, particularly those

that address the continuing threat posed by

Iraq’s possession and development of chemical,

biological and nuclear capabilities.

Although this is a broader resolution than

the Spratt resolution, I will vote for it because

it represents the best remaining hope of disarming

Saddam. While the resolution does not

require it, the President has said that it is his

intention to continue to work towards a new

UN resolution that can make the inspections

program effective.

The President initially resisted going to the

UN, but he changed course. He initially resisted

coming to Congress to explain his purpose

and to seek our support, but he changed

course. We should respect the distance he

has traveled towards a multilateral, measured

process that includes the UN. We should support

him as long as he remains on that

course.

I do so today knowing full well this administration’s

record on the issue of nonproliferation,

arms control and multilateral treaties has

often been incomprehensible. At times he has

spoken and acted as if he would prefer to act

without allies and without the UN. Several

weeks ago, the President announced a strategic

doctrine that embraces the ‘‘preemptive

use of force’’ as its touchstone. This new Bush

Doctrine is dangerous and destabilizing in its

own right. It makes it harder to hold together

the fragile international coalition on which we

rely for success in the ongoing war on terror.

The contradictions and double-standards

that define his non-proliferation policy are particularly

troubling. His ‘‘Axis of Evil’’ speech,

for example, lumped together Iraq, Iran and

North Korea in a turn of the phrase that is

hard to untie. They have all been accused of

attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Yet our response in Iran is not to

use force, but to complain to the Russians

about their sale of reactors to Iran that could

facilitate the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

And in North Korea, our response is to make

our own sale of nuclear reactors to that country.

The President has also failed to seek Senate

ratification of the Comprehensive Test

Ban, pursued new nuclear weapons like the

earth penetrating warheads, and turned his

back on the biological weapons convention.

This makes no sense and belies a lack of any

coherent policy at all.

It is certainly true that George W. Bush is

not the first president to be self-contradictory

regarding weapons of mass destruction. I

have spent considerable effort during the last

26 years working to prevent the constant undermining

of nonproliferation policy by both

Democratic and Republican administrations.

The Carter Administration shipped nuclear fuel

to India notwithstanding that countries’ ongoing

undeclared nuclear weapons program. The

Reagan Administration condemned Israel in

the UN for destroying Saddam’s Osirak nuclear

reactor. The same administration promoted

nuclear trade with the apartheid regime

in South Africa. Both President Reagan and

President Clinton allowed trade with Communist

China to trump efforts to stop China

from retransferring nuclear materials and technology

to Pakistan.

Now it is the Bush administration that fails

to connect the dots of weapons proliferation.

When he promotes nuclear reprocessing, or

tritium production for bombs in commercial reactors,

he undermines nonproliferation. When

he allows the export of sensitive nuclear technology,

discards the comprehensive test ban

treaty, or fails to negotiate progressive measures

leading to global disarmament—as mandated

by Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty—he strengthens the

proliferators.

These decisions come back to haunt us

when, as now, we find that diplomatic options

are exhausted and the use of force appears

necessary.

But even as our overall nonproliferation policy

keeps lurching from side to side, the

United States and the international community

have, in the particular case of Iraq, remained

focused for more than a decade on the very

real menace of Saddam’s drive to acquire and

use weapons of mass destruction against his

perceived enemies.

Now, after 11 years of insufficient inspections

and sanctions, we cannot stand idle.

Something has to change. We have nearly exhausted

the non-violent alternatives. The

sanctions are contributing to a significant loss

of innocent life daily. Saddam has built up his

chemical and biological weapons capacities

during this period and he has missiles to deliver

a nuclear payload and the money to buy

it. It is apparent that but for our demonstration

of resolve to follow through the UN-sponsored

goal of disarming him, Saddam Hussein intends

to make good on his pledge to acquire

nuclear weapons.

I wish the resort to force were unnecessary

and, if the inspections can be made effective,

armed conflict can still be avoided. But while

force is a last resort, is an option that cannot

be ruled out if we intend to deal effectively

with Saddam Hussein.